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Abstract
Past research has strongly linked moral development to a number of anti-social
acts (Seijts & Latham, 2003) with the exception of workplace deviance (WD). This study
explored a person-by-situation interactionist model that incorporated moral-cognitive
development as a moderating determinant between organizational justice (OJ) and WD.
One hundred undergraduate students read one of two hypothetical vignettes that depicted
a student worker who experienced either an act of organizational injustice or justice.
Participants also completed measures of moral reasoning (DIT2), OJ, intentional WD and
a social desirability scale. Multiple Regression Analysis showed that participants who
exhibited higher levels of the Maintaining Norms schema had lower WD intentions when
the work situation was just, and those with higher levels of Postconventional thinking
may be associated with lower perceptions of OJ in the unjust scenario. However, this did
not necessarily translate to overt retaliatory behaviour towards the employer.
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1
Introduction
Workplace Deviance is a widespread and costly problem that many organizations
encounter (Trevino &Youngblood, 1990). For example, it has been estimated that one in
three employees have stolen from their employer at least once, and many of these people
repeat their actions on a regular basis (Delaney, 1993). While theft is probably the most
well known act of workplace deviance, other antisocial behaviours are regularly
performed in the workplace by a spectrum of employees, ranging from blue-collar
workers to white-collar workers, in both profit and non-profit organizations (Giacalone &
Greenberg, 1997). Some examples, to demonstrate the diversity of workplace deviance,
are behaviours such as: employee sabotage, harassment, tardiness and time theft
(Giacalone & Greenberg). In addition, with the wide availability of the Internet in
workplaces nowadays, checking personal e-mail and browsing the Web can be
considered further deviant acts that are concerning employers. For example, a survey
conducted in 2005 revealed that employers pay their employees almost $760 billion a
year for spending work time on the Internet, for non-work related reasons (Freedman,
2006).
Many theories exists that attempt to explain how workplace deviance is engendered,
especially ones that involve perceptions of organizational fairness. For example, Equity
Theory, which was first proposed by Adams (1965), asserts that stealing from an
organization can be understood as an attempt to re-establish equity between the parties
involved (i.e., between the employee(s) and the organization) in a social exchange
relationship (Greenberg, 1997). The Relational Model of Organizational Justice is
another example and it is concerned with how the worker is led to believe that he or she
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is being treated fairly or unfairly by the organization, by taking into account several
justice-related elements that lead the worker to either act in a cooperative or
uncooperative manner towards the organization in which he or she works (Lind, 1997).
However, perceived fairness, by itself, is not necessarily sufficient to motivate employee
theft. Whereas most employees probably experience some level of injustice at some
point in their careers, only a portion of workers make the conscious decision to retaliate
against the organization by engaging in some form of deviant behaviour (Greenberg,
2002). Why is this? One possible solution is that the relationship between inequity and
workplace deviance needs to be elaborated further by taking into account dispositional
traits (Trevino, 1986). In other words, there needs to be a model that takes a person-bysituation interactionist approach to explaining workplace deviance.
Trevino (1986) outlined some individual characteristics that moderate the relationship
between organizational justice and workplace deviance, such as personality, ego strength,
intelligence, field dependence and locus of control. Moral reasoning is one such
individual factor that has yet to be extensively examined by researchers. Moral
reasoning is defined as a person's mental representation of the self as well as the person's
ability to engage in complex reasoning of moral issues (Bennett et al., 2005). It should
be noted that moral reasoning does not have the same meaning as the term morality,
which is considered to be a set of codes and conduct that is set by society or an individual
that need to be adhered to by people (Gert, 2005).
Studies that have attempted to use Lawrence Kohlberg's (1984) theory of the six
stages of moral reasoning as a moderating variable between organizational justice and
workplace deviance generally found that the occurrences of Postconventional reasoning

3

levels (Kohlberg's highest level of moral reasoning) was consistently found to be low
across these studies, making it difficult to find interaction effects (Rest et al., 1999a).
Although Kohlberg may have argued that this was because Postconventional reasoning
levels are difficult to reach and are rarely found in our society, Rest et al. (1999a) argued
that Kohlberg's conceptualization of moral-cognitive development as a theory, and the
methods he used to measure moral reasoning, may have made it too difficult for people to
exhibit Post-conventional reasoning in research contexts. Therefore, Rest et al.
developed the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral cognitive-development, which some
consider to be more sensitive in detecting the variability of Post-conventional levels in
samples. If this is true, then the increase in variability of Postconventional levels may
allow researchers to find that moral reasoning interacts with other variables, such as
organizational justice, to explain why workplace deviance occurs.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the current study utilized a person-by-situation
interactionist model to explore moral reasoning (a dispositional determinant) as a
potential moderating variable in the relationship between organizational justice (a
situational determinant) and workplace deviance (outcome factor). However, it could be
argued that, intuitively, it makes more sense to assign moral reasoning as the causal
variable and organizational justice as the moderating variable because moral reasoning
could be characterized as the more stable and enduring factor. However, it was decided
to assign organizational justice as the causal variable because past literature has well
established such a causal relationship between organizational justice and workplace
deviance through experimental methodology (e.g., Greenberg, 1990; Greenberg, 1993;
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and Greenberg, 2002). Future research should address this theoretical issue in order to
portray a more accurate depiction of the person-situation interactionist model.
Figure 1. A person-by-situation interactionist model integrating moral-cognitive
development, organizational justice and workplace deviance.
Level of Moral Cognitive-Development
(Personal/Dispositional Factor)

Perceived Organizational Justice

•

Likelihood of Engaging in
Workplace Deviant Behaviours

(Situational Factor)

(Outcome Factor)

The Costs of Workplace Deviance
Antisocial behaviour in organizations has been defined as "any behaviour that brings
harm, or is intended to bring harm, to an organization, its employees, or stakeholders"
(Giacalone & Greenberg, p. vii). It has also been referred to as workplace deviance or
dysfunctional behaviour (Giacalone & Greenberg) and employee counter-productivity
(Bennett & Robinson, 1995; Boye & Jones, 1997). The term workplace deviance is used
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throughout this paper because it appears to be one of the more popular terms used in
recent research in this area.
The media and scholarly literature have addressed concern for the rise in workplace
deviance (Giacalone & Greenberg, 1997) and its prevalence in a variety of industries
(Boye & Jones, 1997). A survey completed by supermarket employees in 1995 revealed
that 42% of the employees had taken cash, merchandise, and/or property from their
employer, 29% of the employees had abused sick days, and 20% of the employees
confessed that they had come to work hung over from alcohol in the last six months (as
cited in Boye & Jones). Furthermore, from the same survey, 60% of restaurant
employees admitted to some type of theft in the last six months, and 80% of restaurant
employees admitted that they had engaged in some type of workplace deviance other than
theft, such as using illicit drugs or alcohol at work; intentionally working in a slow or
sloppy manner; and engaging in unsafe workplace behaviour. In terms of costs, a wide
range of delinquent organizational behaviour, including employee theft, can cost $6
billion to $200 billion (Murphy, 1993). Moreover, theft by employees has been blamed
for 20%> of all business failures (Delaney, 1993). Workplace deviance also occurs at high
levels of the most revered institutions. For example, recent attention has been given to
white-collar crimes, as opposed to blue-collar crime. White-collar crime occurs in the
form of financial dishonesty, at large profit and non-profit organizations, conducted by
high-level managers, religious leaders and political leaders (Giacalone & Greenberg,
1997). For example, Enron Corporation was a world leading energy company that
received media attention after its directors were accused of corporate fraud and
corruption in their accounting reporting, resulting in bankruptcy and on-going
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prosecution (Knottnerus et al., 2006). Hence, workplace deviance is a prevalent and
costly problem, occurring in most industries and seemingly at every level.
Turning to Social Theory to Explain Workplace Deviant Behaviour
Seijts and Latham (2003) called for the field of Industrial/Organizational (I/O)
Psychology to turn to social theory as the field's foundation for research and application.
They argued that psychology often failed to transfer knowledge across its subfields,
although, relative to other subfields, the bridge between I/O and Social Psychology had
always been strong because these two subfields have explored similar ideas but in
different contexts. They further argued that this allowed for the advancement of
knowledge because it showed that findings from within these two subfields have external
validity. For future research, the authors suggested that I/O psychology researchers
should attempt to integrate more social theory into their research, to help explain
organizational behaviour phenomena. Among their suggestions for specific areas of
research that could be conducted, was to use Kohlberg's (1984) theory of moral
reasoning to explain why workplace deviance occurs in the workplace.
Clearly, ethical and unethical behaviour in the workplace is an important and
relevant social issue demanding the attention of organizational researchers (Trevino &
Youngblood, 1990). Seijts and Latham (2003) suggested that Kohlberg's (1984)
cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning could be one possible explanation as
to why some people engaged in workplace deviance, such as: manipulation of the
organization's balance sheets, insider trading, faking tests, theft, sabotage, harassment,
cheating, violence, tardiness and absenteeism. They argued that past research has been
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able to link ethical value development to a number of anti-social acts, including
disobedience, cheating, aggression, and alcohol and drug use. Consequently, they felt
that these findings had relevance to organizational researchers, who wished to pursue
ethical value development and moral reasoning as research avenues that could explain
workplace deviance.
Seijts and Latham (2003) raised some interesting application questions that could
be explored by combining morality and workplace deviance research. However, an
important research question needs to be answered first, before application can be
addressed: is moral reasoning a predictor of workplace deviance? By first establishing a
link between moral reasoning and workplace deviance, further research questions can be
addressed, and several applications may be possible. By conducting empirical research to
evaluate these possible applications, one could potentially discover more motives behind
counterproductive behaviors, whereby building more "complete" models in psychology
for both Social and I/O Psychology (Seijts & Latham).
Why does Workplace Deviance Occur?
General Theory of Crime - Some theories have tried to address why employees
engage in workplace deviance. For example, the concept of low self-control accounting
for criminal activity comes from the General Theory of Crime, first proposed by
Gottfredson and Hirschi in 1990. The theory proposed that low self-control was caused
by ineffective child rearing and it was characterized by several traits, such as:
impulsivity, preference for simple tasks, risk-seeking, preference for physical rather than
mental activities, self-centeredness and quick-temperedness (Langton, Piquero &
Hollinger, 2006). Evidence has shown that low self-control is associated with criminal
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and analogous behaviours, if people are given the opportunity to engage in such
behaviours (Gottfredson & Hirschi; Langton, Piquero & Hollinger). Though the theory
has received strong empirical support, it is a topic of contention among criminologists
and sociologists, and it continues to be debated (Langton, Piquero & Hollinger). For
example, there is ongoing debate as to whether the theory can explain white-collar or
corporate crime; on one hand, it can be argued that it does not make sense to believe that
white collar workers can exhibit low self-control, and therefore, the theory does not apply
to them, and on the other hand, it can be argued that white collar offenders can exhibit
low self-control (Langton, Piquero & Hollinger).
Aggression/Revenge - Bies, Tripp and Kramer (1997) argued that, in some cases,
theft could be classified as an aggressive act, rather than an act for economic gain. They
explained this by suggesting that sometimes employees steal items that they do not intend
to use or sell because they realize that by taking them, they will be inflicting economic
loss on the organization, or they will inconvenience or harm specific employees who
need these items. In other cases, affective aggression can be explained whereby an
employee steals from his or her workplace because he or she believes it is justified, due
to what they conceive as income underpayment by the organization.
When we think of revenge, we would most likely conjure up something negatively
emotional, irrational and socially unacceptable. However, Bies, Tripp and Kramer
(1997) argued that revenge does not necessarily have to be destructive and antisocial; it
can also be constructive and prosocial. For example, they stated that threatening revenge
can be a powerful tool against power abuse by authority figures in the organization, and
sometimes it can be used for conflict resolution. Bies et al. proposed a theoretical
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framework for understanding and explaining revenge cognitions and behaviour in the
workplace. They argued that revenge cognitions and acts occur in response to a
perceived personal harm or violation of the social order. That is, when an employer does
something that seems unjust or disrupts perceived equity, the subordinate may attempt to
restore balance and equity though his or her actions.
Organizational Justice - Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel and Rupp (2001) argued that
the concept of justice appeals to our moral sentiments; we feel that fairness makes things
right. They reasoned that, every day, people face situations at work that necessitate
casual explanations that are morally just, which in turn, motivates us to react in a
particular way. This perspective is known as the Moral Virtues Model (Folger, 1998),
and it states that we care about justice because many of us have basic respect for human
dignity and worth and we want to act in accordance with this respect. Folger has
supported this model by showing that people care about justice even when there is no
financial gain and even when strangers are involved.
Organizational justice scholars have, so far, identified three classes of events that are
evaluated in terms of justice: outcomes, processes and interpersonal interactions
(Cropanzano et al., 2001). These classes are also better known as Distributional,
Procedural and Interactional Justice, respectively (Adams, 1965; Lind, 1997; Niehoff &
Moorman, 1993). Distributional Justice (Equity Theory; Adams, 1965) involves
judgments regarding the fairness of outcomes or allocations. For instance, workers, who
perceive that their outcomes (e.g., pay, benefits, vacation time, bonuses, etc.) are not fair,
may engage in deviant behaviours, such as theft, in order to balance out the input-output
ratio. Also, workplace deviance could occur because a worker may have perceived that

10
there has been a breach in Interactional Justice (Lind; Niehoff & Moorman). The
concern here is with people's perceptions of being treated in a courteous and dignified
manner, especially by authority figures. Last, Procedural Justice is characterized as how
fairly an organization makes decisions on issues that are relevant to a worker (Lind;
Niehoff & Moorman).
There has been empirical support to link organizational justice theories and
workplace deviance. For example, in a quasi-experiment, Greenberg (1990) compared
the theft rates within three manufacturing plants belonging to the same company. In two
of the factories, all employees were given a pay cut of 15% over a 10-week period, due to
the company going through a financial crisis (experimental groups), while a third factory
experienced no pay cuts (control group). Specifically, he wanted to look at the
phenomenon of Distributional Justice, in which there is concern over the perceptions and
evaluations of outcomes, such as pay, in this example. Greenberg (1990) found that the
theft rates were significantly higher within the plants in which employees experienced
pay cuts compared to the workers in the factory who did not. Greenberg (1990) also
noted that these results were especially interesting considering the fact that theft rates
were consistently low in all three plants both before the pay cut and after regular rates of
pay were reinstated. Greenberg (1993) has also been able to repeat these results in a
laboratory setting, using undergraduate students, who had to perform a clerical task, and
they were either adequately or inadequately compensated for their labour.
However, Greenberg (1990) also wanted to consider the social determinants of
organizational justice that may contribute to deviant behaviour. In the aforementioned
study, the two experimental groups that received pay cuts also received different
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explanations as to why they would be receiving pay cuts. One group was given an
elaborate and caring explanation as to why the pay cuts were needed, while the other
group was given little information or compassion as to why their pay was being cut.
Interestingly enough, over twice as much theft occurred in the plant where the employees
received an inadequate explanation about the need for the pay cut and little compassion.
Ambrose and Arnaud (2005) stated that the primary focus in organizational
justice research has been to examine the unique variance accounted for by each type of
justice (e.g., Distributional, Procedural and Interactional Justice), in order to demonstrate
the utility of understanding different types of justice. However, they argued that focusing
on the unique variance may obscure the overall impact of fairness on the outcome
variable. Consequently, other researchers have called for more attention to be given to
overall fairness (Ambrose & Arnaud). For example, Greenberg (2001) asserted that
when individuals develop perceptions of justice, they are making a "holistic judgment in
which they respond to whatever information is both available and salient" (p. 211).
Others have argued that victims of injustice will not necessarily worry about whether
there are two or more types of justice, but rather, they will react to the general experience
of injustice (Shapiro, 2001). Further, McClelland (1997) argued that researchers often do
not consider the optimality of their research designs. That is, by complicating research
designs to test for effects that are irrelevant to the research question(s), researchers risk
reducing statistical power for detecting the effects of the greatest interest(s) to the
researcher. In addition, by not utilizing optimal designs, researchers increase the costs to
participants, which can be both unethical and unpractical. For instance, McClelland
argues that the "imposition of experiment participation requirements on students in
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introductory psychology classes is difficult to justify if subject hours are used
inefficiently" (p. 3) and increase the unnecessary risk of harm to the participants. For
these reasons, the current study will not measure the different facets of Organizational
Justice but rather, a combination of the facets.
Individual Differences - Langton, Leeper Piquero and Hollinger (2006) assert that
because a variety of external and individual level factors related to workplace deviance
exist, there is no single factor or theory that can account for each and every occurrence.
For instance, even within the same company, two seemingly high-risk workers, who hold
the same position and may possess the same demographic characteristics, are not both
necessarily going to commit workplace deviant acts. As such, Langton et al. assert that
there must be internal traits that predispose a worker to workplace deviance. However,
the authors pointed out that in all of the literature on employee theft, there are few studies
that have considered the potential role of individual dispositional traits that could predict
workplace deviance.
The current research considered and explored one such dispositional element: a
person's level of moral-cognitive development. It seems intuitive to acknowledge that
deviant behaviour does not only concern actions that are deviant from social norms, but
could also concern deviations from our personal values, in terms of what a person
considers to be morally right or wrong. It also seems intuitive that people make such
moral evaluations in both social and organizational contexts, alike. In actuality, there is
merit for exploring moral reasoning as a possible predictor of workplace deviance, on
empirical and not just intuitive grounds. Research has linked moral reasoning levels to
other anti-social acts (Rest et al, 1999a), such as adolescent crime (Raaijmakers, Engels,
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& Van Hoof, 2005). As a result, it is expected that people also apply the same moral
reasoning processes to organizational contexts.
Kohlberg 's Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Reasoning
For the purposes of this study, it is important to understand Lawrence Kohlberg's
original theory of moral reasoning. He is credited with many accomplishments, including
helping to bring about the cognitive revolution against the behaviorist paradigm prevalent
at that time; bringing American attention to Jean Piaget's (Kohlberg's intellectual
mentor) work; and providing a way to look at morality that went beyond that of virtues
and traits (Narvaez, 2005). In essence, Kohlberg proposed a cognitive-developmental
perspective of moral reasoning that could contextualize our understanding of
organizational justice, as it relates to deviant behaviour in the workplace.
Kohlberg believed that our moral understandings begin to develop in systematic
ways in childhood; that there are developmental transformations in those ways of
thinking as we grow from childhood to adulthood; and that people's level of moral
reasoning depends on their level of cognitive development (Turiel, 2006). Kohlberg
measured people's level of moral reasoning by presenting a series of stories, each
reflecting a moral dilemma. The person must give a resolution of the dilemma and give
reasons for choosing that resolution, through a rigorous interview format. By this,
Kohlberg believed that a person's stage of moral development depends not on the
resolution, but rather on the reasons behind that resolution. By this method, Kohlberg
(1984) identified three levels of moral reasoning, which is further divided into two stages
at each level. The Preconventional level would be characterized by a person's concern
with the consequences for oneself. The Conventional level of moral reasoning would be
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demonstrated by concern over upholding laws, conventional values and obedience to
authority. Finally, the Postconventional level, which contains the highest stages of moral
reasoning, is displayed by someone who is concerned with obeying mutually agreed upon
laws and by the need to uphold human dignity. Further elaboration upon each of the six
stages can be found in Duska and Whelan (1975).
Kohlberg generated many ideas for morality research, some of which, in the last
40 years, turned out to be useful and some not (Rest et al., 1999a). For example, while
Kohlbergian theories have yet to be found to be useful for issues of micromorality, they
have been found useful for issues of macromorality (Rest et al., 1999a). Macromorality
issues concern the formal structure of society, as given by institutions, rules and roles,
while micromorality concern issues dealing with face-to-face relations that people have
in everyday life (Rest, et al., 1999a). Rest and al. (1999b) suggested that macromorality
problems may address several different issues, such as the fairness of an institution, role
structure or general practice, or whether a society or institution is organized in such a way
that different ethnic, religious, and sub-cultural groups can cooperate in it and support it.
Examples of macromorality judgments include the controversial issues of same-sex
marriage, abortion rights, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom (Rest et al.,
1999b). Rest et al. (1999a) described micromorality as concerning oneself with
"generally acting in a decent, responsible, empathic way in one's daily dealings with
others" (p. 292) and concerns a range of issues, from remembering a friend's birthday
and being punctual for appointments, to fostering one's relationship with a loved one
(Rest et al., 1999a). Due to this limitation, and other limitations (that are described
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below), this study utilized the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to understanding moral
reasoning.
The Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Moral Reasoning
Despite its critics, empirical evidence for Kohlberg's general theory is more
bountiful than ever before (Narvaez, 2005). Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma (1999a)
considered many theoretical arguments and much empirical evidence, and they still
believed that Kohlberg had many important and useful things to say about the nature of
morality. However, they added on some new elements, including a new definition of
cognitive structures, in terms of schemas (instead of stages), and using different research
strategies (Rest et al). Despite these changes, the Neo-Kohlbergian approach still shares
several main ideas with Kohlberg's original theory, which they believed were core
assumptions of a cognitive-developmental approach to moral reasoning. First, the NeoKohlbergian perspective's starting point still emphasizes cognition (Rest et al.). For
example, like Kohlberg, Rest et al. believe that a person's level of sophistication, in terms
of moral reasoning, is dependent on his or her level of cognitive development. Second,
they also concentrate their research on the personal construction of basic epistemological
categories (e.g., rights, duty, justice, social order, and reciprocity).
However, the Neo-Kohlbergian approach also departs from several of Kohlberg's
assumptions and ideas about the study of morality. For instance, critics of Kohlberg have
argued that his approach focuses on one small piece of morality in terms of relevant
psychological processes (Narvaez, 2005). Specifically, Kohlberg believed that moral
judgment was the only component needed to tap into other aspects, such as a person's
motivations, sensitivities and potential for action (Narvaez). Researchers who subscribe
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to the Neo-Kohlbergian approach agree with Kohlberg's critics and consider moral

judgment to be just one of four psychological elements that comprise moral behavior or
functioning; the other three being moral sensitivity, moral motivation and moral action
(Narvaez).
Like Kohlberg, Neo-Kohlbergian theory also views moral reasoning as ordered
developmentally, where it is possible to "advance" morally where "higher is better"
(Narvaez, 2005). It emphasizes the shift from Conventional to Postconventional moral
thinking in adolescents and adults, not in stages, as Kohlberg proposed, but rather as
moral schemas. Schemas are understood by schema theorists as general knowledge
structures (e.g., expectations, hypotheses, concepts, regularities) residing in long-term
memory and that are formed as people notice similarities and recurrences in experiences,
and they help to facilitate information processing (Rest et al, 1999a). Therefore, they are
flexible in form and adaptation and include both procedural knowledge (e.g., rules) and
declarative knowledge (e.g., concepts and facts) (Narvaez). Further, they can be applied
subconsciously and automatically or in a manner that is conscious and controlled
(Narvaez).
In the Neo-Kohlbergian approach, moral schemas are different from Kohlberg's
concept of stages. Schemas are envisioned as shifting distributions, rather than using
Kohlberg's staircase metaphor (Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al., 1999a). For example,
Kohlberg's notion of "hard" stages is conceptualized in terms of moving up a staircase,
one step at a time, without skipping any steps and without reversing to go back down the
stairs (Rest et al.). On the other hand, Rest et al.'s concept of moral schemas are "softer"
and involve being able to gradually replace more primitive ways of thinking by more
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advanced ways of thinking, but still being able to return to older or more primitive ways
of thinking because it believes that we rely on different ways of thinking about most
phenomena.
The Three Moral Schemas
The Neo-Kohlbergian perspective consists of three moral schemas that were
inspired by Kohlberg's (1984) original stages of moral reasoning. It states that the
development of moral reasoning occurs through three moral schemas (Rest et al., 1999a).
It is assumed that these schemas guide people's thinking in everyday decision making
and that the underlying structure of moral judgment, as assessed by the Defining Issues
Test (DIT) (Rest et al., 1999b), consists of three developmental schemas: Personal
Interests, Maintaining Norms, and Postconventional (Rest et al., 1999a; 1999b).
Personal Interests Schema - Rest et al. (1999a) argue that almost all participants
who take the DIT have viewed this schema as an earlier and more primitive form of
thinking that they have already passed during childhood, which is in line with research
involving Kohlberg's Preconventional stage of moral reasoning. When one utilizes this
schema, a person is predominantly concerned with matters of personal interest and is
unable to consider cooperation with others in terms of macromorality relationships. In
other words, he or she has not yet discovered Society, the awareness that people do not
only relate to each other on a face-to-face basis, but also through institutions, role
systems, and established practices (Narvaez, 2005). Furthermore, a child utilizing this
schema is self-focused and has a survival orientation to life, which may require
negotiated cooperation with only others who are known (i.e., in-group reciprocity)
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(Narvaez). Unfortunately, the DIT cannot adequately access this particular schema
because it requires a reading level of a 12-year-old and most people who demonstrate
predominate utilization of this schema would be under this age (Rest et al.).
Maintaining Norms Schema - This schema tends to develop in adolescence when
one 'discovers society' in such a way that he or she comes to understand that people are
related through institutions, role systems, and rules (Rest et al., 1999a). There is also
now a concern for the welfare of others (Narvaez, 2005). Further, one comes to realize
that in addition to micromorality issues (i.e., deals with individual behaviour that is
manifested in everyday personal interactions), that there is also macromorality issues
(i.e., there is a formal structure of society as defined by institutions, rules, and roles)
(Rest et al.). An individual accessing this schema would maintain that morality is defined
by an established social order (e.g., the Law; Rest et al.) that requires everyone to adhere
or conform to a set of conventions. Further, going against such conventions is regarded
as inviolate, at this level (Rest et al.). In fact, obeying authority, out of respect for the
system, is regarded as more important than interpersonal relationships and even respect
for other people (Narvaez). This schema was derived from Kohlberg's Conventional
stage of moral reasoning (Rest et al.).
Postconventional Thinking Schema - The development of the Postconventional
Thinking norm usually occurs in late-adolescent development, and it has become one of
the best indicators of college student development (Narvaez, 2005). Rest et al. (1999a)
argue that those operating at the highest level of moral reasoning access this schema and
come to recognize that moral obligations are to be based on shared ideals, which are
reciprocal and are open to debate. One using Postconventional Thinking would agree
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that social arrangements occur in many different ways that may require people to
conform to a set of behaviors; however, it does not mean that a person ought to behave in
those ways because there is the realization that the Law itself can be biased in that the
social norms favour some at the expense of others (Rest et al). Therefore, acts against
convention can be justified as long as the act is not self-serving at the expense of others;
the act respects others and serves group goals; and the act furthers cooperation and the
common good (Rest et al.). For example, according to Turiel (2006), several studies on
close relationships, such as that between a husband and wife, have shown that the
majority of undergraduates and adults judge deception to be wrong. However, the
participants also felt that it was more acceptable for a wife to maintain a secret bank
account when her husband worked and tightly controlled the family finances but not the
other way around (i.e., when the husband kept a secret bank account, while his wife
worked and kept tight reins on the family finances). The researchers asserted that people
take into account the general structure of power in society, when they are making these
kinds of decisions; in this case, men are given greater power and control over women,
and that family relationships seem to be based on the type of injustice that grants greater
privileges and entitlements to men over women.
The phenomenon of Postconventional Thinking can be demonstrated in an
interesting Milgrim obedience experiment, conducted by Kohlberg in 1969. In each trial,
the experimenter ordered the naive participant to give increasingly severe shocks to a
confederate. It was found that 75 percent of participants who exhibited predominantly
Postconventional thinking (equivalent to Kohlberg's highest moral reasoning stage) quit
the experiment, while only 13 percent of lower stage participants quit (Kohlberg, 1969).
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These results can be attributed to the ability of the Postconventional Thinking participants
to take into account the importance of individual rights and universal ethical principles,
over conformity and complete obedience of authority.
Measuring Moral Reasoning
Criticisms of Kohlberg's (1984) Interview Method - The method of measurement
is one of the biggest differences between both approaches to moral development.
Kohlberg utilized the interview method to measure a person's level of moral development
(Rest et al., 1999a). The interview method requires a person to explain his or her choices
in making moral decisions (Rest et al.). His rigorous interview procedure was called the
Moral Judgment Interview and was assumed, by Kohlberg and his followers, to provide a
clear window into the moral mind (Rest et al.). Critics of this approach have argued that
Kohlberg's method is overly dependent on verbal expressiveness (Narvaez, 2005). Rest
et al. argued that people do not necessarily have direct access to their cognitive
operations when making self-report explanations. They stated that people can report on
the products of cognition but cannot verbalize so well on the mental processes that they
used to arrive at such products (i.e., their mental reasoning works in ways that they do not
understand and in ways that they cannot explain). They further argued that this was a
possible explanation as to why few participants could be found to possess
Postconventional thinking in Kohlberg's studies. In other words, they suggest that the
interview method does not elicit people's tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is outside
the awareness of the person's thought processes, important in human decision-making,
and is beyond a person's ability to articulate verbally (Rest et al.). According to Rest et
al., support for a lack of introspective access has been documented in many social
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phenomena research, such as studies involving: attribution, word recognition, conceptual
priming, and expertise.
The Defining Issues Test - The Defining Issues Test, Version 2 (DIT2) is a
questionnaire that assesses a person's level of cognitive-developmental moral reasoning.
It is understood as a device that activates moral judgment schemas from long-term
memory (Navaez, 2005). Further, it is an updated version of the original Defining Issues
Test, Version 1 (DIT1), which was first published in 1974 (Rest et al., 1999b). A metaanalysis involving 400 studies indicates that the DIT1 has been found to be highly valid
on several criteria that are relevant to the theoretical assumptions of the cognitivedevelopmental approach to moral reasoning (Rest et al.). In their review of studies using
the DIT1, Thoma, Rest and Barnett (1985) found that 32 out of 47 statistical analyses
were significant for measures of prosocial and antisocial behaviour. In addition, data
from the DIT1 has been shown to be relatively reliable (e.g., both Cronbach's alpha and
test-retest reliability are in the upper .70's and lower .80's) (Rest et al.). Moreover,
several studies have concluded that moral judgment scores are difficult to fake on the
DIT (Barnett et al., 1995).
After 25 years of using the first version, Rest et al. (1999b) came up with a second
version that is shorter; it is more updated in terms of the dilemmas used; it has clearer
instructions; it purges fewer participants due to a new participant reliability check method
(see below); and it has significantly better validity characteristics than the first version.
Their validation study of the DIT2 was able to re-confirm the basic findings about the
moral judgment construct in terms of developmental, political attitudes and choices, age
and education trends. It was also shown to be equally valid for both men and women. In

addition, they used a different method of calculating a developmental score (i.e., the N2
index; Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, et al., 1997). The N2 index is the overall score used that
measures a person's development of Postconventional Thinking. The N2 index is made
up of two components, which measure a participant's prioritization of the higher stages,
and a participant's discrimination and rejection of the lower stages (Rest et al.).
More specifically, the DIT2 is a paper and pencil multiple-choice inventory that is
designed to activate moral schemas (to the extent that person has developed them) and
assesses them in terms of importance judgments (Rest et al., 1999b). Narvaez (2005)
asserts that the Neo-Kohlbergian schemas measure the ways in which people answer
macromorality questions, and how they organize society-wide cooperation with unknown
others. They do not measure a person's ability to answer micromorality questions, such
as those relevant to getting along with family and friends (Narvaz, 2005). It is important
to note that, because the Neo-Kohlbergian view of moral reasoning rests on schemas that
can be accessed given situational circumstances, and that various schemas (e.g., postconventional reasoning) can be more or less well-developed for people, these schemas
can be assessed along dimensions. The N2 is the dimension that assesses postconventional reasoning. Everyone has a score on N2, with low scorers being less likely
to utilize this type of moral reasoning and high-scorers being more likely to utilize this
type of moral reasoning. While people can be categorized according to the DIT2, based
on which schemas they primarily rely on, a more useful aspect is that scores are obtained
for each schema.
Despite the prevalence and severity of workplace deviance, our understanding of
workplace deviance remains somewhat limited (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). One barrier
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to research is the scarcity of established procedures to measure workplace deviance.
Bennett and Robinson (2000) produced one such measure, which contained two factors:
Interpersonal Deviance and Organizational Deviance. Interpersonal Deviance reflects
deviance targeted at other members within the organization, while Organizational
Deviance reflects deviance targeted at the organization itself. Examples of items from the
Interpersonal Deviance factor are: 'making fun of, 'being rude to' or 'playing a practical
joke on someone at work'. Examples of items from the Organizational Deviance scale
are: 'working on a personal matter instead of working for your employer', 'taking
property from work without permission' and 'taking additional or longer breaks than is
acceptable at your workplace'. In addition, Bennett and Robinson believed that
workplace deviance could occur along a continuum of severity. Therefore, their two
factors included both serious and minor forms of workplace deviance.
Proposing a Person-Situation Interactionist Model
Bennett and Robinson (2003) acknowledged that past and present research has
focused on several antecedents of workplace deviance, including: deviance as reactions to
experiences; deviance as reflections of one's personality; and deviance as adaptation to
the social context. Of particular interest, among workplace deviance researchers, are
people's impressions of, and responses to, organizational justice and how that can
translate to overt deviant behaviour in the work context. For example, not all employees
who experience negative affects at work, in terms of perceived unfair outcomes, are
prone to aggression or feelings of retaliation, nor do all of those who experience pressure
from work peers engage in workplace deviant behaviour. Then why is it that people
differ in their responses to perceived organizational injustice in the workplace? Bennett
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and Robinson hinted that more complex relationships exist in the experience-reaction
relationship at work.
At the time of this writing, only one published study that has considered moral
cognitive-development as a potential moderator in the experience-reaction relationship
concerning workplace deviance was found. Greenberg (2002) found evidence for a
person-by-situation interactionist approach to ethical behavior. His results revealed that
employees who had attained Kohlberg's Conventional level of moral development
refrained from stealing money in the face of perceived underpayment for a task when
they worked in an office that had an ethics training or awareness program. However,
Conventional thinkers who had worked at an organization without an ethics program
were more likely to steal from the company in the face of perceived underpayment.
Interestingly, he also found that those who believed that the money came from the
organization, rather than from individual managers, were more likely to steal under any
condition. This last finding is not surprising because the cognitive-developmental
approach to moral reasoning works better in macromorality rather than micromorality
situations.
Clearly, Greenberg's (2002) findings suggest that in addition to situational factors
(i.e., organizational justice), individual factors (i.e., moral reasoning) may also play a role
in explaining why workplace deviance is more likely to occur in a given situation.
However, he measured and viewed people's level of moral reasoning through Kohlberg's
(1984) approach. Consequently, he was unable to recruit a significant sample with
Postconventional reasoning. As mentioned earlier, Kohlberg's approach is limited in that
samples with Postconventional levels of moral reasoning are rare and difficult to find.
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Rest et al.'s (1999a) Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral reasoning was derived partly to
address this issue. The DIT2 is able to purge fewer participants due to a new participant
reliability check method, which results in stronger trends on validity criteria because it
retains a wider range of scores (such as Postconventional Thinking scores), resulting in a
fuller distribution of scores (Rest et al., 1999b). As a result, the DIT2 was used in the
current study to measure moral-cognitive development.
One of the main goals of the proposed research will be to validate and extend the
general findings found by Greenberg (2002) with the goal of making a contribution to the
literature about the effects of Postconventional thinking on workplace deviance, through
the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral reasoning. This is also an opportunity to test the
external validity of the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral-cognitive development with
organizational behaviour. That is, can the DIT2 interact with Organizational Justice to
predict work outcomes or work-related behaviours, such as workplace deviance?
Specifically, it was expected that if employees experience organizational
injustice, that some may choose to be deviant because they are better able to justify their
deviant actions on moral grounds because the social contract has been breached by the
employer. For example, when a worker is hired, there is a psychological contract that
forms between the worker and the organization. A psychological contract can be defined
as "individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of the exchange
agreement between individuals and the organization" (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 9). Research
has shown that a breach in a psychological contract can lead to feelings of anger and
frustration by employees and that this relationship can be moderated by judgments of
fairness (or Organizational Justice) (Zhao et al., 2007). As such, an employee who

adheres to obligations of good work ethic and job performance will expect that the
organization will reciprocate by rewarding that employee with fair pay and treatment. In
other words, the organization also has social and moral obligations towards the workers
and when it breaches this contract, retaliation may seem to be justified by some.
A similar example can be illustrated with the psychological contract that is
assumed between a nation's Government and its citizens. It is understood that if a citizen
obeys the Law, works and pays his or her taxes, then the Government is obligated to
justly reward him or her by maintaining adequate social programs, providing protection
and protecting human rights (Rest et al., 1999a). However, when the Government
breeches this contract, some citizens would consider this to be a political problem and are
thereby able to justify unlawful acts as morally right, from cheating on their tax returns to
committing treason (Rest et al.). As such, if we can view an organization and the
Government as similar entities, then we can view a breach of a psychological contract as
a political issue at both types of institutions. Therefore, this study is concerned with
deviant actions targeted at the organization (a macromorality issue) rather than members
of the organization (a micromorality issue). As stated before, the Neo-Kohlbergian
approach works particularly well for macromorality issues relative to micromorality
situations.
The current study explored participants' deviant intentions to perceptions of two
varying levels of organizational justice, which was manipulated using hypothetical
vignettes. It was predicted that a person's level of Postconventional Thinking would
moderate this relationship. Hence, organizational justice and moral reasoning acted as
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two separate independent variables. The dependent variable consisted of participants'
intentions of workplace deviance.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that the relationship between organizational
justice and workplace deviance would be moderated by people's level of
Postconventional Thinking. That is, it was expected that people who possessed higher
levels of Postconventional Thinking would be more likely to engage in workplace
deviance when perceived low organizational justice, relative to those who possessed
lower levels of Postconventional Thinking. Furthermore, it was predicted that one's level
of Postconventional Thinking would not influence workplace deviance intentions in the
control group (i.e., high organizational justice condition). Put yet another way, it was
hypothesized that there would not be a significant slope resulting from regressing
workplace deviance on the N2 index (Postconventional Thinking) for the low
organizational injustice condition, but that there would be a significant positive slope for
the high injustice condition.
As stated earlier, the main goal of this study was to contribute some knowledge
on the Postconventional Thinking schema and how it relates to Organizational Justice and
workplace deviance. Therefore, no hypotheses were made about the Personal Interests
and the Maintaining Norms schemas, although their effects were explored in subsequent
post-hoc analyses.
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Method
Participants
One hundred participants (24 males and 76 females) were recruited from the
undergraduate Participant Pool at the University of Windsor. Participants signed up for
the study online to earn research credit towards their psychology course. Prior to
completing the study, participants were asked to give written informed consent to
participate in the research study. Participants were also asked to provide their personal
demographic information (See Appendix I). At the end of the research study, participants
were given and read a debriefing form and were awarded their research credit.
Most of the participants were White or Caucasian (69%). The remainder came
from other ethnic backgrounds, such as East Asian (10%), African American (3%),
Native Hawaiian (5%), South Asian (4%), Other (4%), or Mixed (5%). The mean age
was 23.06 (SD - 5.55) and the median was 21.00 years. The mean for total number of
years of post-secondary education was 2.86 (SD = .70) and the median was 2.50 years.
More specifically, 64% of the participants had between two and four years of postsecondary education; 20% had between one and two years; 14% had over four years; and
4% had less than one year. Furthermore, 68% of the participants indicated that they had
worked in retail at one time or another. Some of the retail industries that the participants
had been exposed to included: groceries, restaurants, fast foods, clothing, movie theatres,
furniture stores, variety stores, bookstores, shoe stores, gas bars, photography stores,
pharmacies, fabrics, pet stores, electronics, liquor, commercial equipments, arts and
crafts, and automotive parts. Working in a grocery store, restaurant, fast food restaurant
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and clothing store setting were among the most frequent answers given by the
participants.
Measures
DIT2 - The DIT2 was used to measure participants' level of moral reasoning. The
DIT2 forms were ordered from the Center for the Study of Ethical Development, which is
located at the University of Minnesota. The measure consisted of five paragraph-length
hypothetical dilemmas, each followed by 12 issues. The dilemmas consisted of: (1) a
famine situation in which a father ponders whether he should steal food for his starving
family from a rich man who is hoarding food in his warehouse; (2) a newspaper reporter
must make a decision whether to report a damaging story about a political candidate; (3)
a school board chairperson must decide to hold a contentious and dangerous open
meeting; (4) a doctor contemplates whether he should give an overdose of painkiller to a
frail patient; and (5) a scenario where college students demonstrate against U.S. foreign
policy (Rest et al., 1999b). The participant is asked to perform a recognition task,
whereby they rate and rank the items in terms of their importance. During the
recognition task, Rest et al. assert that as the participant sees an item that both makes
sense and also taps into his or her preferred schema, then that item is judged as highly
important. On the other hand, when the participant encounters an item that either does
not make sense or seems simplistic and unconvincing, the participant will give it a low
rating and then pass over it (Rest et al.).

As mentioned earlier, the DIT2 has several reliability checks, consisting of several
methods. First, the rate-and-rank consistency check flags cases that are not rating and
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ranking the items consistently, as too much inconsistency suggests that the participant
may have been randomly responding to the questionnaire (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). The
second reliability check method looks for cases that have a high preference for
"meaningless items"; these items are included as items in the questionnaire and contain
unusual, pretentious or complex words/syntax, but are virtually meaningless to the actual
dilemma (Bebeau & Thoma). Therefore, if a participant endorses more than 10 of these
items on the questionnaire, then that case is deemed unreliable, as it is assumed that he or
she is responding to a style of wording or syntax rather than to meaning (Bebeau &
Thoma). The reliability checks also take into account missing data; that is, if there are
cases that have too much missing data (i.e., the participant fails to rate three or more
times and/or he or she leaves six or more rankings blank), then it is assumed that the
participant is not taking the questionnaire seriously and consequently, is purged from the
data set (Bebeau & Thoma). Finally, if the participant is unable to differentiate either the
ratings or rankings of more than one dilemma, then he or she is purged from the data set
(Bebeau & Thoma). This happens when a participant either gives all of the items from a
story the same rating (e.g., all of the items are given 3's) and/or the participant ranks the
same item more than once (e.g., the item is ranked 1st, 2nd, 3 rd and 4th).
Organizational Justice Scenarios - Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
hypothetical vignettes that manipulated the level of organizational justice into low
(experimental condition) and high (control condition). The context of the scenarios was
borrowed from the vignettes created by Langton, Leeper, Piquero and Hollinger (2006)
for their study on employee theft and low-self control. Both vignettes instruct the
participant to imagine that he or she is a university student employed at a grocery store
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for the past six months. Organizational justice was manipulated when the vignette either
indicated that the manager and organization treated the student in a fair manner (high
organizational justice) or unfair manner (low organizational justice).
The pilot study (as outlined in the procedures section) tested several different
vignettes that manipulated the nature of the injustice behaviour(s) as enacted by the
manager and organization. For example, the nature of the unjustified behaviour took
form in one of three ways: the manager gives his son a pay raise/promotion when it was
originally promised to the student (See Appendix II); the student finds out that the
manager's son, who just started working at the grocery store, makes more money than
him or her (See Appendix III); and the manager cuts down on the student's hours and
gives them to his son instead (See Appendix IV). The vignette that generated the highest
levels of organizational injustice in the pilot study was the scenario depicting the
promotion being given to the manager's son, rather than the student (See Pilot Study
Results section). As a result, this vignette was used in the actual study for the low
organizational justice condition. Finally, the high organizational justice condition
involved a vignette that depicted the student being rewarded for his or her hard work with
a pay raise and more hours (See Appendix V).
Workplace Deviance - The workplace deviance intentions scale was derived from two
sources. The first source was Bennett and Robinson's (2000) Measure of Workplace
Deviance. Since the current study is only concerned with deviance targeted at the

organization, only the Organizational Deviance scale was used and not the Interpersonal
Deviance scale. The Organizational Deviance scale consisted of 12-items, but one item
was omitted (i.e., "falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money that you spent on
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business expenses") because it was deemed irrelevant to the hypothetical work scenario.
Therefore, this omission left 11-items that were taken from the measure created by
Bennett and Robinson. Data from this measure has acceptable internal consistency with a
Cronbach's alpha of .81 (Bennett & Robinson). Further, it showed discriminant validity
and convergent validity with other workplace deviance scales (Bennett & Robinson).
The second source was from Hollinger and Clark's (1983) self-report survey
completed by employees in the retail sector (N = 3,567) who engaged in deviant acts
while working in a retail setting. The original survey consisted of 30-items, but 16-items
were removed from this study because they appeared to be unclear, irrelevant or
overlapped with items from the Bennett and Robinson measure. After refinement, the
final workplace deviance intentions measure consisted of 25-items that utilized a 7-point
Likert-type scale (See Appendix VI).
Organizational Justice - The pilot study utilized an organizational justice measure
(See Appendix VII). Some items were re-worded so that they were clear, personally
relevant, consistent, and made sense with the vignettes. The respondent was asked to
indicate the extent to which they agree with each statement on a five-point Likert-type
scale.
Two out of three items were borrowed and edited from Parker, Baltes and
Christiansen's (1997) Distributive Justice sub-scale to assess participants' perceptions of
outcome fairness. For example, the item 'If one performs well, there is appropriate
recognition and reward' was re-written as 'If you performed well, there is sufficient
recognition and rewards at this organization' and the item 'If one performs well, there is
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sufficient recognition and rewards' was re-worded to say 'There is appropriate
recognition and reward at this organization, if I perform well'. The reliability from this
data set was .88 (Parker et al).
Procedural Justice items were taken from a measure developed by Daly and Geyer
(1994), which assesses the extent to which employees perceive that the company has used
fair procedures (Fields, 2002). Two out of the four items from their Procedural Fairness
sub-scale was borrowed and edited. For example, the item 'The organization went about
deciding to move in a way that was not fair to me' was edited to become 'The
organization went about deciding about the promotion in a way that was fair' and the
item 'The steps that the company took to make the relocation decision were fair to me'
was changed to say 'The steps that the company took to make the promotion decision
was fair'. The reliability of the data was reported to be .88 (Daly & Geyer).
Two out of three items from Daly and Geyer's (1994) Justification sub-scale was also
borrowed and edited. For example, the item 'Management did not explain to me why the
move was taking place' became 'Management did not explain to me why the promotion
decision was made the way it was' and the item 'Management never really explained why
the company was moving' was changed to 'Management fully explained to you why the
company made the decision about the promotion'. The reliability for this sub-scale was
.77 (Daly & Geyer).
Finally, four items from a six-item interactive justice sub-scale from Moorman (1991)
was utilized in this study. These items are: 'Your supervisor considered your viewpoint';
'Your supervisor was able to suppress personal biases'; 'Your supervisor treated you with
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kindness and consideration'; and 'Your supervisor showed concern for your rights as an
employee'. The reliability of data was .93 (Moorman).
Social Desirability - A salient threat to validity is the tendency for participants to
answer self-report questions in a way that they feel is socially expected, to gain social
approval (Collazo, 2005). Therefore, social desirability was measured using the short
form version of the Marlowe-Crown Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982) (See Appendix
VIII). Higher scores on this scale indicated increased likelihood that the participants are
responding in a socially desirable manner, such as over-self-reporting of socially
desirable attitudes and behaviours and under-self-reporting of socially undesirable
attitudes and behaviours (Collazo). However, no cut-off score is given or recommended
for this scale (Collazo). This 13-item scale demonstrated an adequate level of internal
reliability (ncR-20= -76) and compares well with the reliability of some of the longer
versions of the Marlowe Crown Desirability Scale (Reynolds). As well, it shows
concurrent validity with other social desirability scales (Reynolds).
Design
The current study was a one-way design with two levels. The first level was high
organizational justice (control condition) and the second level was low organizational
justice (experimental condition). The data were analysed using a multiple regression
analysis (MRA) to test the null hypothesis (H0) that no relationship existed between
organizational justice, moral-cognitive development and workplace deviance intentions.
Further, dummy coding was used to represent the two levels of organizational justice
(i.e., 0 = control, 1 = experimental).
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Procedure
Pilot Study - Prior to data collection, an application was sent to the University of
Windsor Research Ethics Board for approval. Upon approval, a pilot study was
conducted with 40 participants, who were recruited from the undergraduate Participant
Pool to test for an organizational justice effect. The pilot study was designed to assess
the participants' perceptions of organizational justice for one of four vignettes.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions (10 participants in each
condition), and they were asked to read their respective hypothetical vignette.
Afterwards, they were instructed to complete the organizational justice scale and the
workplace deviance intentions scale. Participants were then debriefed, thanked for their
participation and given their research credits.
Subsequent analyses of the pilot study data were conducted to reveal which one of
the three hypothetical vignettes that presented high levels of organizational injustice in
different contexts would create the highest level of perceived organizational injustice for
a student population. The scenario that was subsequently used in the study was the story
depicting the student being passed up for a promised promotion and the promotion was
given to the boss' son (See Pilot Study Results section).
The main study was conducted in groups of approximately one to five
participants. Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental condition
(i.e., they received the hypothetical work scenario that conveyed a low level of
organizational justice) or the control condition (i.e., they received the hypothetical work
scenario that conveyed a high level of organizational justice). After reading their
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respective scenarios, participants were asked to complete the workplace deviance
intentions scale. This measure took participants approximately five to 10 minutes to
complete. The completion of the DIT2 was counterbalanced so that half of the
participants completed it before completing the workplace deviance intentions scale and
the other half completed it afterwards. The DIT2 took each participant approximately 30
to 45 minutes to complete. After completing the measures, the participants were given
the written debriefing form, in which it was indicated that their role ended with the end of
the experiment, and that no one would further scrutinize the consequences of their
intentional actions (recommended by Greenberg & Eskew, 1993). The final task required
the participants to complete the short form version of the Marlowe-Crown Social
Desirability Scale, which took approximately five minutes to complete. Finally,
participants were thanked for their participation and awarded with 1.0 research credit.
The DIT2 questionnaires were scored by the Center for the Study of Ethical
Development.
Pilot Study Results
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis that no main
effects were present for the four hypothetical scenarios on average organizational justice
scores. The analysis showed that a significant main effect for type of scenario existed for
organizational justice, [^(3,39) = 39.79,/? < .01, a>2 = .74]. The analysis also showed that a
significant main effect for type of scenario was evident for workplace deviance, [-^(3,39)

=

3.33,p = .03, CO2 = .15]. Means and standard deviations are outlined in Table 1. A posthoc analysis, using the Bonferroni method, revealed that all three experimental groups
were significantly different from the control condition (in which fair treatment was
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depicted) in terms of organizational justice scores: unfair promotion (p < .01, d — 4.85),
unfair pay (p < .01, d= 4.12), and cut in hours (p < .01, d= 3.14). However, the unfair
promotion condition resulted in the lowest organizational justice scores (M= 1.67, SD =
.34). Therefore, this scenario was used in the study as the experimental condition.
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations
Condition8

M

SD

Organizational

Unfair promotion

1.67

.34

justice scores

Unfair pay

1 R1

.41

Cut in hours

~ nn

.55

Fair treatment

3.55

.43

a

n = 10 participants in each condition.
Main Study Results

Data Analysis
The data analysis for the DIT2 scores suggested that seven cases were potentially
unreliable, according to the reliability checks that were derived from the Center for the
Study of Ethical Development. However, Bebeau and Thoma (2003) warned that there is
some evidence that suggests that their reliability checks can be too stringent; therefore,
they suggest that researchers should first try running the analysis with all of the
participants included and then again without the purged participants (e.g., those cases that
failed the reliability checks). By doing so, it was found that purging the "unreliable"
participants did not significantly impact or change the significance levels for any of the
analyses. By examining these seven cases in detail, it was determined that there was
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nothing significantly different or unique about these participants in terms of demographic
information or outcome scores. Consequently, the following analyses were conducted
with all of the participants included because the preservation of power is important for
small sample sizes, such as this one.
The file was first split by condition to examine workplace deviance intentions
scores by group. From there, two outliers in the control group were revealed; that is,
their z-scores were above 2.5. To preserve power levels, the workplace deviance scores
for these two cases were converted to the second highest score in the control group (i.e.,
4.72). This method is generally accepted when you have a small sample size and have
scores that are very unrepresentative that bias your statistical model (Field, 2005).
The assumption of absence of multicollinearity was examined by computing
Tolerance and VIF values. Since the tolerance levels were above .10 and the VIF levels
were below 10 (cut-offs are suggested by Field, 2005), for all three of our predictor terms
(e.g., condition, Postconventional Thinking score, and condition X Postconventional
Thinking), multicollinearity was deemed not to be a significant problem in the data.
Next, a histogram plot of the standardized residuals suggested that the assumption of a
normal distribution was met by the data set. Also, a normal P-P plot of the standardized
residuals suggested that the assumption of linearity was also met by the data.
Furthermore, a scatterplot that displayed the standardized predicted scores and the
standardized residuals yielded the expected random scattering of data points, which
suggested that the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity had been met.
Additionally, the Durbin Watson statistic was calculated to be 2.16, which was deemed
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acceptable, as it was close to 2 (as suggested by Field), suggesting that the assumption of
independence of errors was met.
Influential observations were evaluated by examining standardized DIFITs
values. By using a generally accepted cut-off of 2.0 (Field), no influential cases were
found. To calculate outliers on v, studentized deleted residuals were examined. Using a
value of 2.5 as a cut-off, I found one outlier; however, by looking at the Cook's distance
statistic for this case, and by removing it from the data set and running the analysis again,
it was determined that the case did not have an overall significant influence on the model,
so the case was left in. Leverage values were calculated and a cutoff of 0.06 was adopted
(derived from 2(k + 1)/N: Field). Through this, seven outliers were found on x. With the
outliers were removed, the condition term in the regression equation was not significant,
with the outliers included, the condition term was significant (p - .05) in the regression
equation. It was possible that by removing the outliers that this resulted in a significant
reduction in power for the analysis, which ultimately affected the significance of the
condition term in the regression equation.
This possibility was tested by calculating the observed power for the data set, by
running a one-way ANOVA and inputting N2 scores as the covariate variable. Before
removing the seven outliers, the observed power was calculated to be .50 and the partial
n2 was .039. After removing the outliers, the observed power reduced to .47 and the
partial n2 was .038. Furthermore, the regression weights remained relatively the same,
while the p value increased when the outliers were removed. As a result, this suggests
that the loss of statistical significance in the condition term was likely due to lower power
of the analysis after removing these seven observations, rather than any undue influence

40
of the observations. Therefore, to preserve power, the MRA was run with all outliers
included.
Before running an MRA to test for Maintaining Norms scores as a moderator
between condition and workplace deviance scores in a post-hoc analysis, the same
diagnostics tests were conducted as stated previously. The data set was deemed to have
met the assumption of a normal distribution, assumption of absence of multicollinearity,
assumption of independence of errors, and assumption of linearity. With regards to
outliers, one potential influential observation was found using the Cook's Distance
statistic and two possible outliers on x, when leverage values were examined, and by
using the same cut-off values as before. Despite removing these cases, the model was
still significant so they were removed from the data set for the MRA.
Also, since there was no recommended cut-off score for the social desirability
scale, the scores were converted to z-scores and one potential outlier was found, using a
cut-off of 2.0 (i.e., the case has a high social desirability score). However, when the
outcome scores of that particular case were examined, nothing seemed out of range
relative to the means, so the case was left in the data set.
Results of Analyses
As suggested earlier, while most people will transition from one schema to
another, depending on the context and complexity of the situation, their answers on the
DIT2 can suggest that they are utilizing predominantly one type or schema, more so than
the other two schemas (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). The results showed that the data set
contained a variation of all three moral reasoning schemas: 23% were Personal Interests
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schema dominant; 37% were Maintaining Norms schema dominant; and 40% were
Postconventional Thinking schema dominant.
It should be noted that participants' moral reasoning scores were somewhat
consistent with the scores found in the literature. For example, in Bebeau and Thoma's
(2003) meta-analysis of 13,386 respondents, 2,096 Freshman students exhibited a mean
N2 score of 31.05 (SD = 14.42); 1,028 Sophomore students exhibited a mean N2 score of
31.24 (SD = 14.94); 1,333 Sophomore students exhibited a mean N2 score of 32.65 (SD =
16.04); and 2,441 Senior students exhibited a mean N2 score of 36.85 (SD = 15.53). The
norms support the Neo-Kohlbergian perspective that Postconventional Thinking increases
with education level. The mean N2 scores for the current sample by educational level are
outlined in Table 2. While the mean scores were consistent for Freshman students and
Sophomores, they are inconsistent for Juniors and Seniors, which were lower than the
norms found in the meta-analysis. They are also inconsistent with the Neo-Kohlbergian
notion that Postconventional thinking increases with education level. The mean N2 score
for the present data set was 30.00 (SD =15.12) with the average number of postsecondary education being 2.86 years.

Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for N2 Scores
N

M

SD

Vocational/Technical

1

36.27

Jr. College

2

54.30

2.79

Freshman

15

30.21

13.18

Sophomore

15

25.48

15.06

Junior

26

32.25

14.09

Senior

34

29.72

16.67

Professional degree

2

14.82

6.11

Other

2

25.54

2.19

Total

97

30.00

15.12

Means and standard deviations for all demographic information and outcome
scores are outlined in Table 3. The analysis revealed that the Cronbach's alpha for data
collected from the Bennett and Robinson (2000) workplace deviance items was .90.
Furthermore, the Cronbach's alpha for data from the final workplace deviance intentions
measure (which incorporated items from Hollinger and Clark's (1983) survey) was .94.
The Cronbach's alpha for the organizational justice measure was .86.
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations
Af

SD

23.06

5.55

2.86

.70

Average organizational justice score

2.81

.99

Average workplace deviance score

2.79

1.11

Total social desirability score

7.17

2.10

Postconventional thinking (N2) score

30.00

15.12

Personal interests score

27.96

12.56

Maintaining norms score

32.86

15.05

Age
Total number of years of post-secondary
education

"based on N= 100.
Pearson correlations between participants' demographic information, outcome
variables and moral reasoning scores are outlined in Table 4. One notable relationship
that occurs within this correlation matrix is that of between age and average workplace
deviance intentions scores; that is, age was found to be negatively associated with
workplace deviance intentions (r = -.23, p = .02). Additionally, Personal Interests scores
were negatively associated with Social Desirability scores (r = .22, p < .05); however,
this finding is not surprising, as one would expect someone, who mainly cares for one's
own self interest, to not be overly concerned with social norms or what other people may
think of him or her.
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Table 4
Pearson Correlation Matrix Independent of Condition
PSEa

A

§e

PSE (years)
OJ
WD
SD
N2

(years)

0J b

WDC

SDd

N2e

PIf

MNg

.31*

-.01

-.24*

.06

.08

-.03

-.04

-.09

.02

.07

.14

-.09

.01

-.16

-.06

-.04

-.05

.02

-15

-.02

.05

-.19

.19

-.22*

-.04

-.53*

-.15

_PI
-.32*
a
c
* p < .05, two-tailed. Post-secondary education. Organizational justice. Workplace
deviance. Social desirability. ePostconventional scores. Personal interest scores
.8Maintaining norms scores.

However, the interpretation of some of the other correlations may not make sense
unless the condition group is taken into account. Therefore, Pearson correlations between
participants' moral reasoning scores and outcome variables for the experimental
condition (i.e., low organizational justice) are outlined in Table 5. It is interesting to note
that organizational justice was not significantly associated with workplace deviance
intentions. However, Postconventional Thinking scores were related to organizational
justice scores but that this relationship was not statistically significant at the .05 level (r =
-.26, p = .07), suggesting that those with higher moral reasoning levels deemed the
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hypothetical scenario to possess lower levels of organizational justice. The fact that the
finding was not significant may be due to the low power of the study due to sample size.
Also, higher scores on the lowest moral reasoning schema (i.e., Personal Interests
schema) were associated with lower social desirability scores (r = -.28, p = .05).
Table 5
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Low Organizational
Group)

OJf

WD
SD

Justice Condition

(Experimental

WDa

SDb

N2C

PId

MNe

.04

-.23

-.26

.04

.13

.09

-.07

.02

-.15

.26

-.28*

-.02

-.56*

.11

N2

PI
-.37*
c
*p< .05, two-tailed. "Workplace deviance. Social desirability. Postconventional
scores. Personal interest scores. Maintaining norms scores. Oganizational justice.

Finally, Pearson correlations between participants' moral reasoning scores and
outcome variables for the control condition (i.e., high organizational justice) are outlined
in Table 6. As expected, Postconventional Thinking scores were not related to workplace
deviance intentions. However, the correlation matrix reveals that Maintaining Norms
score was associated with workplace deviance intentions; that is, the more concerned one
is with rules, laws and social norms, the less likely one is to have intentions of workplace
deviant behaviour. While no hypotheses were made about the Maintaining Norms
schema, this finding is not surprising, as deviant acts in the workplace is against social

norms and organizational policy and thus, would go against the moral values of someone
who holds these rules and regulations as highly regarded, especially in a situation when
the organization is treating the employees fairly, as was the case in the control group
hypothetical scenario. This is also somewhat consistent with what Greenberg (2002)
found, which will be further discussed later.
Table 6
Pearson Correlation Matrix for High Organizational Justice Condition (Control Group)
WDa

OJf

SDb

.05

WD
SD
N2

N2C

PId

MNe

-.05

-.02

.14

.20

.22

08

.06

-.30

11

-.16

-.05

-.48*

-.54;
-.26

PI
a

c

* p < .05, two-tailed. Workplace deviance. Social desirability. Postconventional
scores. Personal interest scores. eMaintaining norms scores. Oganizational justice.
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to test for mean differences between
the condition groups and organizational justice scores, as well as workplace deviance
scores. The analysis revealed that perceptions of organizational justice levels were
significantly different between the two conditions, ^(95) = 20.3\,p < .01, suggesting that
the control condition had significantly higher levels of perceived organizational justice
(M= 3.68, SD = .43) than the experimental condition (M= 1.93, SD = .42) (See Table 8).
Cohen's d was used to calculate the effect size and was found to be d = 4.12.
Furthermore, workplace deviance intentions scores were also significantly different
between the two conditions, J(98) = -1.99,_p = .05 (See Table 7), suggesting that
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participants had higher intentions to engage in deviant behaviours at work in the low
organizational justice condition (M- 3.00, SD = 1.25) than in the high organizational
justice condition (M= 2.57, SD = .91) (See Table 7) where the effect size was d= 0.39.
Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Organization Justice and Workplace Deviance
Intentions by Condition
Condition
Average

Justice condition

organizational justice

(control group3)

score

M

SD

SE

3.68

.43

.06

1.9

.42

.06

2.57

.91

.13

3.00

1.25

.18

Injustice condition
(experimental group )

Average workplace

Justice condition

deviance score

(control group0)
Injustice condition
(experimental group0)

a

« = 48. bn = 49. cn = 50.

A multiple regression analysis (MRA) was conducted to test the null hypothesis
(Ho) that no relationship existed between organizational justice (which was manipulated
via two conditions) and Postconventional Thinking scores with an outcome variable that
is associated with workplace deviance intentions. The MRA was run using the 'enter'
entry method, which enters all of the independent variables into the regression equation
simultaneously. This entry method was used because I wished to test for main effects
and interaction effects, simultaneously. Prior to running the MRA, the Postconventional
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Thinking scores were centered for the regression equation, in order to help reduce the
occurrence of multicollinearity when constructing the interaction term (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2001). The MRA was run and the omnibus F-statistic revealed that the model was
not significant, F(3,96) = 1.47,/? = .28 (See Table 8) and R2 = .04, SE = 1.10.
Table 8
ANOVA Table for Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x
Thinking x (N2xCond)
df_
Regression

SS_

Postconventional

MS

F
1.47

3

5.32

1.77

Residual

96

115.79

1.21

Total

99

121.10

p_
.23

The coefficients table is outlined in Table 9 and reveals that only the condition
predictor (i.e., Organizational Justice) significantly contributed to the model (p = .05).
Neither N2 scores nor the interaction term were significant in the model (p = .64 and/> =
.49, respectively). With the suspicion that suppressor effects may be present, the MRA
was run again using the 'backward' deletion method, which helps to reduce type II error
(Fields, 2001). The same results were found; that is, only the condition term was
significant in the regression model. Using unstandardized coefficients, the final best
regression equation for this model is as follows:
Workplace deviance intentions = 2.41 +.44 (Condition) + (-.01) (N2 score x Condition) +
.01 (N2 score).

Furthermore, the adjusted R = .014 was much lower than R = .044, suggesting that the
model is not expected to predict workplace deviance intentions well in the population.
Table 9
Coefficients Table Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x Postconventional
Thinking x (N2xCond)
B

SEB

(Constant)

2.41

.38

Condition

.44

.22

-.01
.01

N2 x condition
Postconventional Thinking score

P

P
6.43

<.01

.20

2.00

.05

.01

-.12

-.69

.49

.01

.08

.47

.64

Next, an MRA for Personal Interest scores and Maintaining Norms scores was run, as
separate moderating variables between condition and workplace deviance intentions. It
should be noted that these are considered to be post-hoc analyses that were conducted on
purely exploratory grounds. While the Personal Interests scores did not significantly
moderate the relationship between condition and workplace deviance scores, the
Maintaining Norms scores did so somewhat and the model was significant, F(l, 95) =
3.85, p = .03 (See Table 10). The coefficients table for this regression is outlined in
Table 11.
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Table 10
AN OVA Table for Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x Maintaining
df

Regression

SS_

Norms

MS

F

p

3.85

.03

2

8.92

4.46

Residual

95

110.11

1.16

Total

97

119.03

Table 11
Coefficients Table for Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x
Norms (with interaction term)
B

SEB

(Constant)

3.18

.37

Condition

.46

.22

Maintaining norms x Condition

.01
-.02

Maintaining norms score

p

Maintaining

t

p_

8.53

.00

.21

2.13

.04

.01

.07

.51

.61

.01

-.26

-1.79

.08

However, the interaction term was removed from the regression equation, as it was not
contributing anything significant to the model. However, the correlation matrix suggests
that the interaction term does play a role in this model, but there was not enough
statistical power to detect it. Ultimately, this model accounts for 7.5% of the variance in
predicting workplace deviance intentions (R2 = .075) but would be expected to only
account for 5.5% of the variance in the population (adjusted R2 = .055). Using
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unstandardized coefficients, the best predictive regression equation for this model is as
follows:
Workplace Deviance Intentions = 3.10 + .43 (Condition) + (-.02) (Maintaining Norms
Score)
Table 12
Coefficients Table for Workplace Deviance as a Function of Condition x Maintaining
Norms
B

SEB

(Constant)

3.10

.29

Condition

.43

.22

-.02

.01

Maintaining norms score

p

t_

p_

10.65

.00

.20

1.97

.05

-.20

-2.05

.04

Discussion
Past research has suggested the possibility that both situational factors, such as
organizational justice, and dispositional factors, such as one's level of moral cognitivedevelopment, can impact the occurrence of workplace deviance (e.g., Greenberg, 2002).
Research has linked moral reasoning levels to other anti-social acts, such as adolescent
crime (Raaijmakers, Engels, & Van Hoof, 2005), disobedience, cheating, aggression, and
alcohol and drug use (Seijts & Latham, 2003). However, such research has just begun
and one goal of the current study was to be able to contribute something further to this
promising area of research, for both Social Psychology and Industrial/Organizational
Psychology, alike. The following discussion will begin with an overview of the purpose
of the present study. It will then review the specific hypothesis that were made and
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summarize the findings that were somewhat consistent with the predictions that were
made, along with other interesting findings that were not expected. Possible explanations
for the current findings will then be discussed along with suggestions for future research.
The study's possible limitations will also be addressed, such as experimental issues and
methodical issues.
The purpose of this study was to explore participants' intentions to engage in
deviant behaviour when confronted with one of two hypothetical work scenarios that
manipulated perceptions of organizational justice. Furthermore, it was predicted that a
person's level of Postconventional Thinking would moderate the established relationship
between organizational justice and workplace deviance, such that people possessing
higher levels of Postconventional Thinking would have greater intentions to engage in
workplace deviance when they experience impressions of low organizational justice,
relative to those possessing lower levels of Postconventional Thinking. I was particularly
interested in examining the Postconventional Thinking schema for this study because of
the dearth of literature relating it to workplace deviance. Unfortunately, a moderating
effect for Postconventional Thinking was not found in this study.
It is interesting to note that even though a scenario or situation may be judged, by
someone holding higher Postconventional Thinking levels, as unfair, unconstitutional,
unlawful or wrong, that this does not necessarily translate to overt retaliatory behaviour.
It may be the case that individuals with higher moral reasoning do not engage in

workplace deviant behaviour, as they are considered "petty" or "fruitless". Rather,
employees may be more likely to pursue alternative courses of actions, which were not
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measured in this study, such as quitting the job, confronting the manager, or perhaps
taking no action at all.
Another interesting possibility would be to contemplate the idea that
Postconventional Thinking interacts with low self-control to predict workplace deviant
behaviour. The concept of low self-control comes from the General Theory of Crime (as
discussed in the introduction). Therefore, a possible direction for future research would
be to explore several dispositional factors (such as moral reasoning and self control) as
possible moderators between organizational justice and workplace deviance.
Furthermore, research can explore the relationship between the Personal Interests Schema
and low-self control because it seems intuitive that both are linked; for example, perhaps
poor child-rearing leads to impulsivity, which contributes to one's inability to progress
past the Personal Interests Schema. In the context of the Neo-Kohlbergian view, this
would mean that such people would rely primarily on the Personal Interest Schema, and
exhibit low tendencies (i.e., scores) toward using the Maintaining Norms or
Postconventional Reasoning Schemas. Therefore, it would also be interesting to see
whether the Personal Interests Schema and/or low-self control (as explained by the
General Theory of Crime) interact with organizational justice to predict workplace
deviance.
Another reason why the data may not have supported the hypothesized
moderating relationship may be due to the nature of the DIT2 items. One of the
limitations of the DIT2 is that participants are asked to indicate in what course of action
he or she feels the fictional character in the scenario should engage. Thus, it essentially
asks what a person would condone with regards to another person's actions in a particular
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situation, but not what he or she would do in such a situation. Perhaps it is possible that
it may be much easier for us to condone other people's behaviours than our own. There
are many possible reasons for this, such as the possibility that there are more factors to
take into consideration when we are personally involved in the situation and know more
details surrounding the circumstances. For instance, there are more personal risks and
higher consequences for our own actions, especially when those actions are regarded as
deviant behaviours, such as being terminated from the job or even criminal charges.
One way to evaluate whether this might be a possibility, would be to conduct the
study again, but with the scenarios and questionnaires changed to a third-party status; that
is, the workplace scenarios could depict a fictional character and then the workplace
deviance intentions measures could ask the participant to indicate how little or how much
he or she would agree with the specific acts being committed by the fictional character
being portrayed in the scenario. If it was the case that people are more likely to condone
other people's behaviours, then it would be expected that the data would reveal the
moderating relationship, as hypothesized in the current study, to be true; that is, higher
Postconventional thinkers would be more likely to condone acts of workplace deviance in
the low organizational justice condition than lower Postconventional thinkers.
Interestingly, the post-hoc analyses showed that there was some support for a
person-situation interactionist model of ethical behaviour that is somewhat contrary to
Greenberg's (2002) findings with regards to Conventional reasoning. His results
revealed that employees who had attained Kohlberg's Conventional level of moral
development refrained from stealing money, in the face of perceived underpayment for a
task, when they worked in an office that had an ethics training or awareness program.
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Furthermore, those at the Conventional level of moral development, who had worked at
an organization without an ethics program, were more likely to steal from the company in
the face of underpayment. In the present study, data revealed that one's Maintaining
Norms scores did not predict any outcome behaviours in the low organizational justice
condition. However, the current study did not explore the effects of an ethics training
program, with moral reasoning scores and workplace deviance, as Greenberg had.
The current study was able to examine workplace deviance intentions among
Maintaining Norms schema in a high organizational justice context, which Greenberg
(2002) did not examine. It was revealed that Maintaining Norms scores did significantly
predict workplace deviance intentions in the high organizational justice condition (r = .30, p = .03). This suggests that when an employee strongly values upholding rules, laws
and customs, they are less likely to engage in deviant behaviour, especially when they are
treated fairly by the organization. This seems reasonable, as a person who is accessing the
Maintaining Norms schema believes that respect for the system comes before the respect
for other people (Narvaez, 2005) and this would ring especially true in a situation when
the organization has done nothing wrong. However, it should be noted that the MRA
revealed that the type of condition (or level of organizational justice) was a stronger
predictor of workplace deviance scores than one's Maintaining Norms scores, as it
explained for 43% of the variance in workplace deviance scores, as opposed to 2% of the
variance from Maintaining Norms scores.
The findings from this study suggest that the Maintaining Norms schema may be
a better predictor of workplace deviance intentions than the Postconventional Thinking
schema, although it is too early to assert this more confidently, given the lack of literature
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and the methodological issues present in the current study. However, since workplace
deviance deals with issues of convention, organizational rules and laws, it makes sense
that one who has high standards when it comes to maintaining those norms would
perceive workplace deviant acts as a serious violation against the system and thus, would
be strongly opposed to such behaviours from themselves or others. One direction for
future research would be to attempt to replicate Greenberg's (2002) findings by
manipulating the presence or absence of an ethics program, to determine whether this
interacts with DIT2 scores to predict workplace deviance. It would also be interesting to
try to determine whether DIT2 interacts with Organizational Justice to predict if one is
more or less likely to retaliate against the organization (as in the present study), rather
than an individual manager. Recall that Greenberg found that individuals are more likely
to steal money, under any condition, when they believe it comes from the organization,
rather than from individual managers.
Finally, the current study did support Greenberg's (1993) findings, regarding the
occurrence of higher theft rates in factories that had given pay cuts to its employees. The
current study found that workplace deviance intentions were higher for participants in the
low organizational justice condition relative to the high organizational condition. The
implication of these findings for organizations is that it is important to stress the salience
of organizational justice as a factor that plays an important role in the workplace. For
example, by creating a work environment with clear rules and regulations that are
perceived to be fair and just to subordinates, an organization can potentially and actively
help to mitigate the costs that are associated with workplace deviance, such as economic
costs, as well as costs to organizational morale.
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Further, while there were no a priori predictions made, based on demographic
factors, post-hoc analyses revealed that a significant correlation was present between age
and workplace deviance intentions (r = -.24, p = .02), suggesting that the older one is, the
less likely he or she is to engage in deviant behavior at work. This relationship is
somewhat inconsistent with the literature, however, as a recent meta-analysis by Berry,
Ones and Sackett (2007) of studies on workplace deviance showed, the relationship
between age and workplace deviance appears relatively small (correlations ranged from .09 to -.12). Therefore, future research should more closely examine the relationship
between age and workplace deviance and take into account other factors that may be
involved such as organizational commitment, job satisfaction, financial need, etc.
However, after exploring the demographic information in the data set, and contemplating
possible explanations, it is still not quite understood why a stronger correlation was found
between age and workplace deviance for this specific sample, relative to other studies.
One possible reason why older people may be less likely to commit workplace
deviance is because they may have more to lose if they were to lose or quit their job. For
example, a working adult with a mortgage to pay off and a family to support may face
greater financial and psychological consequences than a working younger student. It is
possible that such participants existed in the current data, as over 10% of the sample was
over the age of 25; however, this possibility is only suggestive as there were no measures
included in the current study that would provide evidence for this explanation.
This study was hindered by several limitations. First of all, I had chosen not to
manipulate different facets of organizational justice for the purposes of exploring their
interaction effects on workplace deviance. However, this decision was made
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consciously, for empirical and methodological reasons, as discussed in the introduction.
However, there are also good arguments to look at the different types of organizational
justice. For example, Greenberg (1990, 2003) examined organizational justice in terms
of Distributional Justice, while the current study manipulated both Distributional and
Procedural Justice between the two hypothetical scenarios. Therefore, it is possible that
the inconsistent findings between the two studies were due to the differing facets of
organizational justice. Consequently, the effects of the different facets of organizational
justice should be given consideration when conducting future research in this area.
Furthermore, because the Neo-Kohlbergian approach is based on the idea that
moral reasoning is constructed through schemas, it is impossible to know whether the
participants utilized their predominant schemas (e.g., as assessed through the DIT2) to
make judgments about their actions, based on the scenario that was given to them. For
example, it is possible that predominantly Postconventional thinkers decided to use their
Maintaining Norms schema to make decisions on whether they would retaliate against the
organization in this specific situation.
Another potential limitation in the current study is the utilization of hypothetical
work scenarios, which requires participants to indicate their intentions of deviant actions,
based on their respective vignette. As a consequence, since participants' responses were
based on conjecture, critics might argue that there may be the possibility that people's
answers were not an accurate reflection of what they would really do in the given
situation (Greenberg & Eskew, 1993). However, Greenberg and Eskew (1993) indicated
that role-playing, or using hypothetical scenarios, is a commonly used method for
learning about different kinds of behaviour believed to occur in organizations. Further,
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they advocated that role-playing techniques could be valid and useful for learning about
the roles and rules that people use to guide their behaviour in organizational contexts. In
the current study, using two hypothetical scenarios allowed us to control for possible
confounding variables and to statistically test for differences in organizational justice
levels as well as workplace deviance intentions. Also, to help detect untruthfulness, a
social desirability measure was included in the current study.
There are some final limitations to this study. First, it was suspected that a small
sample size contributed to the data analysis' low level of power, resulting in some
insignificant effects and relationships, which were confirmed with the low observed
power levels. It is possible that a low sample size affected the variability in
Postconventional Thinking scores (i.e., extreme scores were difficult to obtain), which
may have decreased the power/optimality of the data. Also, there was not an equal ratio
of male and female participants. This is a frequent shortcoming of research that is
heavily comprised of an undergraduate sample. Having a lack of males in the sample
may have impacted workplace deviance scores, as it is possible that one gender may be
more or less likely to overtly retaliate against organizations than the opposite gender.
Therefore, the data from this study is not as gender-representative as is generally
accepted in social science research (e.g., a 1:1 ratio is ideal).
In conclusion, the current study was an opportunity to validate and extend the
findings found by Greenberg (1993; 2002). It was also an opportunity to test the external
validity of the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral-cognitive development with
organizational behaviour. For example, I set out to explore whether DIT2 scores could
predict work outcomes or work-related behaviours, such as workplace deviance.
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Greenberg (2002) had found support for Conventional moral reasoning as being a
predictor that moderated the relationship between organizational justice and theft rates in
plants, but not for Postconventional reasoning. This is because his method of measuring
moral reasoning may have relied too heavily on one's verbal ability and consequently, he
was not able to recruit enough data on Postconventional reasoning. By utilizing the DIT2
in the current study, I was able to contribute information on how Postconventional
reasoners think about and react to situations of organizational justice; that is, the current
study revealed that while Postconventional thinkers may perceive a situation as highly
unjustified, they may more so condone acts of retaliation, rather than engage in overt
retaliatory acts themselves, for various reasons that need to be explored in the future. My
findings were also able to extend Greenberg's (2002) findings regarding Conventional
thinkers (which generally equates to Maintaining Norms thinkers in the current study).
My findings showed that the Maintaining Norms schema is a significant predictor of
workplace deviance intentions when the organization has acted justly and fairly. While
Greenberg was able to show that Conventional thinking could predict workplace
deviance in situations of low organizational justice, the current findings show that the
Maintaining Norms schema may be an important contributor to decreasing workplace
deviant behaviour in situations of high organizational justice, where workplace deviance
can still take place.

However, more research needs to be done to explore this phenomenon and to
better understand its implications for organizational training and selection practices, but
the implications look plausible and promising. Greenberg (2002) had already begun to
explore this practical issue in his study, revealing that the presence of an ethics training
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program can interact with moral development in the workplace to significantly reduce
theft rates. It would be interesting to see what other kinds of organizational interventions
can be implemented to help foster employees' moral or ethical codes, which can
consequently reduce the occurrence of workplace deviance.
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Appendix I
Background Questions
1.

Please indicate your age:

2.

Please indicate your gender: Male or Female

3.

What is your racial/ethnic origin? Please check all that apply.
White or Caucasian
East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese)
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani)
Aboriginal or Native Canadian/American
Arab/Middle Eastern
Hispanic/Latino
Other. Please specify:

4.

How many years of post-secondary education do you currently have? For
example, how many years in total have you attended school beyond high school,
such as community college, university, etc.?
Less than 1 year
1 to 2 years
Between 2 and 4 years
Over 4 years

4a.

The retail industry involves selling goods/products to consumers. Have you ever
worked in retail?
Please circle: Yes

4b.

or

No

If yes, please indicate all of the kinds of retail settings that you have worked in
(e.g., clothing, electronics, groceries, etc.):
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Appendix II
Hypothetical Workplace Scenario 1
Organizational Background:
Directions: Please imagine yourself in the following work scenario:
You are a first-year university student who needs to make some money to help pay for
tuition. You have decided to work evenings and weekends at a retail chain grocery store
where you stock shelves, serve as a cashier and occasionally do inventory entry work on
a computer in the back office, for $8/hour. You hear from other co-workers that the
organization has a reputation for treating its employees unfairly. You work diligently,
know your job well, and develop a reputation for helping other employees when they
have questions about a newly installed computer system. For six months, you regularly
arrive for work on time, work hard during your shifts, and are willing to cover shifts of
those who call in sick. One day, you ask your boss for a promotion to the position of
assistant supervisor, which pays $11/hour. On two separate occasions, your boss tells
you that if you continue to be a good employee, you can expect the promotion within
three months. Three months pass, and one day, you remind your boss about the promised
promotion. Your boss says that you will no longer be receiving the promotion. Instead,
the promotion goes to the boss' son, who has only been working at the company for a few
weeks. You call head office to make a complaint and the representative there tells you
that there is nothing that the company can do.
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Appendix III
Hypothetical Workplace Scenario 2
Organizational Background:
Directions: Please imagine yourself in the following work scenario:
You are a first-year university student who needs to make some money to help pay for
tuition. You have decided to work evenings and weekends at a retail chain grocery store
where you stock shelves, serve as a cashier and occasionally do inventory entry work on
a computer in the back office, for $8/hour. You hear from other co-workers that the
organization has a reputation for treating its employees unfairly. You work diligently,
know your job well, and develop a reputation for helping other employees when they
have questions about a newly installed computer system. For six months, you regularly
arrive for work on time, work hard during your shifts, and are willing to cover shifts of
those who call in sick. One day, you find out that the boss' son, who just started working
at the store, makes $11/hour. He has less experience and does not put in as much effort
into his job, as much as you do. When you confront your boss about this, he tells you
that other workers' salaries are none of your business. You call head office to make a
complaint and the representative there tells you that there is nothing that the company can
do.
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Appendix IV
Hypothetical Workplace Scenario 3
Organizational Background:
Directions: Please imagine yourself in the following work scenario:
You are a first-year university student who needs to make some money to help pay for
tuition. You have decided to work evenings and weekends at a retail chain grocery store
where you stock shelves, serve as a cashier and occasionally do inventory entry work on
a computer in the back office, for $8/hour. You hear from other co-workers that the
organization has a reputation for treating its employees unfairly. You work diligently,
know your job well, and develop a reputation for helping other employees when they
have questions about a newly installed computer system. For six months, you regularly
arrive for work on time, work hard during your shifts, and are willing to cover shifts of
those who call in sick. Then, you notice that your boss is starting to cut down on your
hours. He knows that you are working for money to go towards your tuition. When you
confront him about this, he tells you that he decided to give the hours to his son, who is
trying to save up money for a new car. You call head office to make a complaint and the
representative there tells you that there is nothing that the company can do.
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Appendix V
Hypothetical Workplace Scenario 4
Organizational Background:
Directions: Please imagine yourself in the following work scenario:
You are a first-year university student who needs to make some money to help pay for
tuition. You have decided to work evenings and weekends at a retail chain grocery store
where you stock shelves, serve as a cashier and occasionally do inventory entry work on
a computer in the back office, for $8/hour. You hear from other co-workers that the
organization has a reputation for treating its employees fairly. You work diligently,
know your job well, and develop a reputation for helping other employees when they
have questions about a newly installed computer system. For six months, you regularly
arrive for work on time, work hard during your shifts, and are willing to cover shifts of
those who call in sick. Within three months, your boss is impressed with your job
performance. He decides to raise your pay to $11/hour and gives you the extra shifts you
need to cover your tuition.
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Appendix VI
Workplace Deviance Scale
Instructions: If you were confident that you would not get caught, how likely is it that
you would engage in the following activities, at least once, at this particular workplace
(from 1 = not likely at all, to 7 = highly likely)?

Not
likely at

Highly
Likely

Not
sure

all

lake propem from work wiiluuu
permission

1

Spend too much time fantasizing or
daydreaming instead of working

1

I iiler \ o u r work ai\iu>nnKiu

4

5 6

2 3

4

5 6

3

4

5 6

Discuss confidential company
information with an unauthorized person

1

2 3

4

5 6

I se an illegal drug or consume alcohol
on the job

1

2 3

4

5 6

Use sick leave when not sick

2 3

4

5 6

Punch :i lime card for an nKcni employee

2 3

4

5 6

2 3

4

5 6

Using computer time for personal reasons

1

7

7

I akc care nl'pcrMmal business mi
o>mp;m> lime

2

3

4

5 6

7

Give away company property without the
authority to do so

1

2 3

4

5 6

7

I'sccompain fop\iiiii Uixim: machines
fur personal purposes

1

2 3

4

5 6

7

Make personal calls when unauthorized
to do so

1

2 3

4

5 6

7

I'urpnscU mistical or break cumpain
propcm

1

2 3

4

5 6

7

1

2 3

4

5 6

7

2

3

4

5 6

7

2 3

4

5 6

7

2 3

4

5 6

Use company tools or equipment for
personal reasons away from the
workplace

Keep compan\ office supplies «>r
equipment

Purposely damage company merchandise
so someone can buy it at a discount
I rkler-riny customer purchases lor
\iuirself or annlher employee

1
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Instructions: How likely is it that you would engage in the following activities, at least
once, at this particular workplace (from 1 == not likely at all, to 7 = highly likely)?
Not likely
at all

Highly
Likely

Not
sure

Take an additional or longer break than
is acceptable at your workplace

1

2 3

4

5 6

Come in late to work without
permission

1

2 3

4

5 6

2

3

4

5 6

Neglect to follow your boss's
instructions

7

Intentionally work slower than you
could have worked

1

2 3

4

5 6

Put little effort into vour work

1

2 3

4

5 6

Drag out work in order to get overtime

1

2 3

4

5 6

7

Not reporl ilicl'i of company pr»iperi\ In
another employee

1

2 3

4

5 o

7

7
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Appendix VII
Organizational Justice Scale
Instructions: Based on your perspective of this scenario, please indicate the extent to
which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate
number, beside each statement.
Strongly
Disagree

\ our sii|vr\ isor considered \our
\ iewpoini.

The organization went about
deciding about the promotion in a
way that was not fair.

Your supervisor was able lo suppress
personal biases.

Management fully explained to you
why the company made the decision
about the promotion.

Management did noi give \ou a
chance lo express \our \ie\\s belore
the promotion decision.
Your supervisor treated you with
kindness and consideration.

I here is appropriate recognition and
reward at lliis organization ill

1

Strongly
Agree

pcrfmin well

If you performed well, there is
sufficient recognition and rewards at
this organization.

1

Your supcrv isor showed concern for
your rights as an employee.

1

Management did not explain to you
why the promotion decision was
made the way it was.

1

I he slops I hill ihe cnmp:m\ look in
make I he prnmoiinn decision were
I'nir.

1
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Appendix VIII
Social Desirability Scale
Directions: Please answer the following statements according to your personal beliefs.
Mark each statement true or false by checking the appropriate box.
True False
It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
1 M>melimes feci resentful when 1 don"l nel im own way.
On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought
too little of my ability.
There have been times when I fell like rebelling against people in authority
even though I knew they were right.
No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
1 Mnnciimo u\ u> gel even ralher than torsive and lori;ei.
1 am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from
my own.
There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of
others.
1 am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me.
i

I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.

81
VITA AUCTORIS
Diana Nguyen was born in 1982 in Kitchener, Ontario. She graduated from
Northwestern Secondary School, in Stratford, Ontario, in 2000. From there, she went on
to the University of Guelph where she obtained a B.A. Honours Degree in Psychology, in
2005. She will be receiving her Master of Arts Degree in Applied Social Psychology at
the University of Windsor in June of 2008.

